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Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
in Regional Trade Agreements: CanadaU.S. FTA, NAFTA and Beyond*
Gilbert R. Winham**
Heather A. Grant***
The use of antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties
(CVDs) to prevent or remedy unfair trade practices has been an
important issue during recent multilateral and regional trade
negotiations. It is a particularly difficult issue because parties
differ on the role unfair trade remedies should play in trade policy. One approach is to view these measures as an attempt to
remedy or offset unfair trade practices by foreign governments
or exporters. Alternatively, exporters may view these measures
as politically motivated contingency protection, or as "measures
of 'stand-by protection' or techniques of administered trade."'
Unfair trade remedies are provided on the initiative of specific
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1992. The paper has been distributed as a U.N.-ECLAC/IDB Working Paper
and is forthcoming in a publication reporting on conference proceedings. This
Article is published with the permission of U.N.-ECLAC and the IDB.
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industries on the basis of a complicated body of trade regulations. The system is discrete and highly legalistic, and is an alternative to a more general approach to trade policy based on
multilateral tariff reductions or codes of conduct.
Because parties differ on the role unfair trade remedies
should play in trade policy, these remedies have been applied
unevenly among the Contracting Parties (CPs) to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 2 The result is an "uneven playing field" among trading partners, 3 and it has become
evident that more standardized rules and procedures governing
the application of these remedies are required. A considerable
step in the direction of greater standardization has been
achieved in the Antidumping and Subsidies Codes negotiated in
the Uruguay Round. Elsewhere, other measures have been considered in regional agreements to achieve the desired security of
access to a trading partner's market in order to foster economic
growth in a competitive environment.
The application of AD and CVDs by the United States was
one of the major Canadian grievances that surfaced during the4
negotiation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
Initially, Canada tried unsuccessfully to gain a blanket exemption from U.S. trade remedy laws. As an alternative, Canada
placed considerable emphasis on negotiating a dispute settlement mechanism into the FTA that would reduce Canada's exposure to the use of AD and CVDs by the United States.
The dispute settlement mechanism ultimately incorporated
into Chapter 19 of the FTA provides for judicial-like review of
AD and CVD actions by binational panels. 5 More specifically, it
provides exporters and importers the option of taking a disputed
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A-S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
3. J. Michael Finger, Antidumping and Antisubsidy Measures, in THE
URUGUAY RoUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MuLTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
153, 155 (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987).
4. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1989, 27 I.L.M.
281 [hereinafter FTA]. For a discussion of Canadian grievances regarding the
application of AD and CVDs by the United States, see GILBERT R. WiNIAM,
TRADING WITH CANADA: THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 38 (1988).
5. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(2). Article 1904(2) states, in pertinent
part:
Either Party may request that a panel review, based upon the administrative record, a final antidumping or countervailing duty determination of a competent investigating authority of either Party to
determine whether such determination was in accordance with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing Party.
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AD or CVD action to a binational panel with binding powers in
lieu of seeking judicial review by a domestic court.6 Because individuals from both the United States and Canada sit on the
panels, it is generally assumed that binational panels promote
greater consistency and objectivity in AD and CVD practices.
Although the panels are not authorized to create substantive
law, the review mechanism helps to ensure that each nation is
applying its own laws fairly and consistently. Determinations of
dumping and subsidization can be different in each country, but
will be upheld as long as the administrative agency made its determination in accordance with domestic law. 7 Owing to these
various characteristics, Chapter 19 has been one of the most
unique dispute settlement mechanisms developed in recent
years.
The success of the FTA Chapter 19 mechanism leads somewhat obviously to its consideration as a model for other trade
agreements. What remains at issue is whether this mechanism
can be applied effectively in a considerably broader context, such
as a hemispheric or multilateral trade agreement, given the differences that exist between the legal and administrative practices of the prospective negotiating parties. The purpose of this
Article is to examine some of the obstacles and implications of
adopting a Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism in other
trade agreements. After examining the operation of Chapter 19
in the FTA, the Article focuses on the incorporation of Chapter
19 into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 8
The extension of Chapter 19 to Mexico in NAFTA raised some of
the problems that may later be encountered either in extending
NAFTA to new parties or in establishing a Chapter 19-type
mechanism in other trade agreements.
To appreciate the significance of a Chapter 19 mechanism,
it is first necessary to look at the historical development of AD
and CVD actions in international trade. The intent of this review is twofold. First, it serves to set out the basic tenets underlying the creation of these measures to remedy unfair trade
practices. Second, it illustrates the impact that the use of unfair
trade remedies by the United States had on Canada, and indicates why Canada initially sought a binding dispute settlement
mechanism on AD and CVDs.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-MexicoCanada (Draft of Sept. 6, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF AD AND CVDs
A. AD

AND

CVDs

UNDER THE

GATT

One of the primary objectives of the GATT is to promote secure access to foreign markets so that businesses will feel confident that they can export their products to other countries
without encountering any unfair or unforeseen impediments in
competing for a portion of the consumer market. 9 Dumping and
unrestricted subsidization have long been recognized as serious
obstacles to this objective. Dumping is generally understood as
the sale of goods on a foreign market at a price which is less
than that at which the product is sold on the seller's domestic
market. A subsidy is the granting of a non-commercial benefit,
usually by the government, at any stage of a good's manufacture, production or export.
A general concern about the harmful effects of dumping and
subsidization resulted in their inclusion in the GATT negotiations in 1947. These negotiations concluded with the insertion
of a remedy under Article VI of the final Agreement, which allows CPs to the GATT to take unilateral action to offset the effects of dumping or subsidies on their domestic industries
through the use of AD and CVDs. 10
GATT Article VI allows the application of an AD duty
against an imported good where it is being dumped on the foreign market and is causing or threatening to cause "material injury to an established industry . . . or materially retards the
establishment of a domestic industry." 1 A CVD may be applied
to an imported good to offset the effects of a foreign subsidy
where the subsidy causes, or threatens to cause, injury to the
domestic industry or the potential development of such
12
industry.
The GATT provisions for AD and CVDs represented minimal commitment to any real control over these practices. Over
time, and with increased use, AD and CVDs were arguably used
9. The preface to the GATr states, in pertinent part, that the Contracting
Parties are:
desirous of... entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce....
GATT pmbl.
10. ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A CoMPARATIvE STUDY 6 (John H.
Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
11. GATr art. VI:A.
12. Id. art. VI:6(a).
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less as remedies and more as protectionist devices in themselves. This realization paved the way for the creation of the
Antidumping and Subsidies Codes during the Kennedy Round
in 1967 and the Tokyo Round in 1979. The purpose of these
Codes was to define more precisely the conduct expected of CPs
in their investigation and assessment of dumping and subsidy
practices so that unfair usage would not jeopardize the free flow
of goods.
The first Antidumping Code, concluded in 1967, was replaced in 1979 by a new Code, 13 which sets out more explicit
requirements governing a country's conduct of its antidumping
and injury investigations, and the application of duties or price
undertakings. The Tokyo Round Code has been largely successful in achieving a greater standardization of antidumping prac4
tices among CPs.
In contrast, the Subsidies Code,' 5 negotiated during the Tokyo Round, has not been as useful in standardizing world practice. Like the Antidumping Code; the Subsidies Code imposes
some greater procedural requirements upon signatories with respect to employing subsidies and assessing CVDs. However, because of differing views among trading nations on the legitimacy
of subsidies in domestic economies, and hence a lack of cooperative support, the Subsidies Code is essentially weak international law. Moreover, prior to the Uruguay Round, the
Subsidies Code was not incorporated into the GATT, although
signatories were obliged to implement its provisions into their
domestic laws.
While dumping is generally considered an unfair practice,
not all forms of subsidies are necessarily considered unfair.
Thus, not all subsidies are countervailable. As recognized in the
preamble to the Subsidies Code, subsidies have a dual nature:
they can be instrumental in promoting important domestic policy objectives, while at the same time possibly harming a foreign
industry's competitiveness.1 6 The Code's objective in defining
13. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919 reprinted in BISD 26th
Supp. 171 (1979).
14. Finger, supra note 3, at 156.
15. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Article VI, XVI, and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T.
513 reprinted in BISD 26th Supp. 56 (1979).
16. Id. The preamble states, in pertinent part:
Recognizing that subsidies are used by governments to promote
important objectives of national policy,
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when and how a subsidy may be countervailed is to balance the
harm of a subsidy against the injurious effects of a CVD.
Among CPs, there is considerable disparity in the application of subsidies and CVDs. 17 The United States is by far the
most important country on this matter. The U.S. government
strongly opposes the use of subsidies. In an effort to protect U.S.
producers from competition with subsidized imports, the United
States has been the most frequent user of the CVD mecha-'
nism.i s As a result, subsidies and CVDs are important trade
issues for nations that have extensive trade with the United
States.
B.

U.S. POLICY ON AD

AND

CVDs

The United States is a signatory to both Tokyo Round Codes
and has incorporated the provisions of the Antidumping Code
and the Subsidies Code into U.S. law through the Trade Agreements Act of 197919 (TAA). However, the TAA also contained
provisions which made it easier to bring AD and CVD actions.
The TAA restructured the U.S. unfair trade remedy system
in a politically significant manner. From 1954 until the enactment of the TAA, bureaucratic responsibility for the trade remedy system had been divided between the Treasury Department,
which made determinations of dumping or subsidy, and the International Trade Commission (ITC), which handled determinations of injury. In 1979, responsibility for the former was shifted
to the International Trade Administration of the Department of
Commerce. Because that department was perceived as being
more sympathetic to domestic producers than the Treasury Department had been, this change was widely regarded as a move
20
to facilitate the use of trade remedies by U.S. constituents.
Recognizing also that subsidies may have harmful effects on trade
and production,
Recognizing that the emphasis of this Agreement should be on the
effects of subsidies and that these effects are to be assessed in giving
due account to the internal economic situation of the signatories concerned as well as to the state of international economic and monetary
relations...

Id.
17. J. Michael Finger & Julio Nogus, International Control of Subsidies
and CountervailingDuties, 1 WoRLD BANK ECON. REv. 707, 712 (1989).
18. Between 1980 and mid-1986, the United States initiated 281 CVD actions. THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, Annex 8.
19. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 93-39, § 1(a), July 26, 1979,
93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq. (1988)) [hereinafter TAA].
20. GREY,supra note 1, at 56.
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The main impact of the TAA on CVDs was to incorporate
the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code into U.S. legislation. 2 1 The
major change was to introduce a material injury requirement
into U.S. CVD practice. The obligation to demonstrate injury on
products coming from Subsidies Code signatories was an important change in U.S. law. However, it appears that the require22
ment of "material" injury has not been significant in practice.
Greater transparency in the rules and regulations, as well
as new procedural requirements incorporated into the TAA,
made it easier for domestic producers in the United States to
petition for AD or CVD actions, and to seek review of those actions through the judicial system. 23 This has produced a sharp
increase in the number of actions launched by the United States
21.

Prior to the TAA, the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. I,

§§ 402, 407, 409, Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2487 (1988)), had expanded CVD procedures in U.S. law, especially regarding judicial review. The Act provided for a right to request judicial review
by a Customs Court, which later became the Court of International Trade
(CIT). Manufacturers and producers in the United States were given standing
to make such a request. Previously, only importers had that right. Additionally, parties were given the right to have judicial review of negative findings
and to challenge the amount of a CVD finding in addition to the finding itself.
The Trade Act of 1974 both facilitated the use of CVDs and improved the
procedural safeguards associated with those procedures. For example, writing
about the pre-1974 period, Stanley Metzger noted,
[olne of the most striking aspects of countervailing duty administration in the United States is the almost total lack of procedural safeguards in official proceedings. Neither statute, nor regulations make
any provision for hearings and the usual ancillary procedures according substantial elements of procedural due process to parties or countries affected by a countervailing duty imposition. The lack of
procedural safeguards is peculiarly disturbing in view of the very great
discretion delegated to the secretary of the treasury and, through him,
to the Bureau of Customs.
STANLEY D. METZGER, LOWERING NONTARIFF BARRmRs: U.S. LAw, PRACTICE AND
NEGOTIATING OBJECrVEs 105 (1979).
22. Material injury was defined in the TAA as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant." TAA § 771(7XA), 93 Stat. at 178 (current
version at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(a) (1988)). Washington trade lawyer Matthew
Marks has observed: "I can only conclude.., that the substitution of a material
injury standard for the prior standard of simple injury under the Trade Act of
1974 has had little, if any, effect on the Commission's administration of the
Anti-dumping Act and countervailing duty law to date." GREY, supra note 1, at
46 (citing the text of letter of 31 July 1980 of Matthew Marks to Rodney Grey).
23. See Matthew J. Marks, Recent Changes in American Law on Regulatory
Trade Measures,2 WORLD ECON. 427 (1980). Among the changes to CVD procedures noted by Marks are shortened time periods for the agency to reach decisions, and provision for the use of "best information available," which, as Marks
notes, "traditionally, has been a euphemism for the allegations supplied in the
petition." Id. at 432. Marks states, "Given the strong Congressional criticism of
the Treasury Department's recent administration of the unfair-trade laws ... it
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since the passage of the TAA in 1979 (and the Trade Act of
1974). Prior to 1974, the United States only occasionally resorted to AD or CVD actions. Between 1934 and 1974, approxi24
mately forty-one CVD orders were issued, roughly one a year.
In contrast, the United States initiated 281 CVD investigations
from 1980 to 1986.25 The United States initiated eleven new
CVD actions against Canada alone from 1980 to 1986.26
The use of trade remedies increased worldwide in the 1980s,
but whereas the use of AD duties is fairly evenly distributed
among trading nations, CVDs are principally a U.S. policy instrument.2 7 As aptly described by Patrick Messerlin, "[tlo the
United States, the [Subsidies] [C]ode is an instrument to control
subsidies. To the rest of the world, it is an instrument to control
28
U.S. countervailing duties."
II.

THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT

In view of the frequent use by the United States of unfair
trade remedies during the 1980s, especially countervailing duties, Canada recognized the need to achieve more secure access
to the U.S. market, given its high dependence on trade with that
country and the likelihood of its increased dependence in the future. Security of access, therefore, became one of the major
goals pursued by Canada in the FTA negotiations. During the
negotiations, Canada originally hoped to achieve an exclusion
from the scope of U.S. unfair trade remedy laws. However, the
United States never considered this proposal a serious option.
Canada's alternate suggestion, that a list of "acceptable" and
would seem likely, in situations where all the facts are not available, that
doubts will be resolved in favour of the petitioner." Id. at 433.
24. Michael M. Hart, The Future on the Table: The ContinuingNegotiating
Agenda under the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement, in Lr-n.iG WITH
FREE TRADE: CANADA, THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE GATT 67, 97
(Richard G. Dearden et al. eds, 1989).
25. THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, at 259.
26. Id. at 260.
27. Between 1980 and 1986, AD actions initiated by three GAIT CPs were
as follows: United States 350; EC 280; and Canada 230. Id. at 265. CVD actions initiated over the same period were: United States 281; EC 7; and Canada
11. Id. at 262.
28. Finger, supra note 3, at 156 (quoting Patrick Messerlin, Public Subsidies to Industry and Agriculture and CountervailingDuties (paper prepared for
the European Meeting on the Position of the European Community in the New
GATT Round October 2-4, 1986)).
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"unacceptable" subsidies be established by the parties, similarly
came to an impasse.
Canada's lack of success in negotiating the inclusion of
either of these proposals into the FTA led it to accept an interim
dispute settlement mechanism based on binational panel review
of AD and CVD actions. 29 Canada believed that this mechanism
would provide some indirect control over the use of U.S. trade
remedy laws against Canadian goods. For Canada, the mechanism was fundamental to closing a deal. Had the proposal been
rejected by the United States, Canada would not have signed the
Agreement. Only hours before the deadline, the United States
agreed to a binding dispute settlement mechanism covering AD
and CVDs.
Dispute settlement on AD and CVDs is included in Chapter
19 of the FTA. The Chapter contains three parts. First, the parties agreed to continue negotiating on dumping and subsidy issues, and to establish alternative rules in seven years if
possible. 30 Although the parties created a Working Group to
pursue this task,3 1 both countries agreed to negotiate issues of
29. The idea for binational review was first proposed by Representative
Sam Gibbons, chairman of the Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. It was enthusiastically accepted by the Senate Finance Committee which had strongly opposed any attempt to grant exceptions for Canada from U.S. trade remedy laws. See
WINHAM, supra note 4, at 42.
30. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1906. Article 1906 states:
The provisions of this Chapter shall be in effect for five years pending
the development of a substitute system of rules in both countries for
antidumping and countervailing duties as applied to their bilateral
trade. If no such system of rules is agreed and implemented at the end
of five years, the provisions of this Chapter shall be extended for a further two years. Failure to agree to implement a new regime at the end
of the two-year extension shall allow either Party to terminate the
Agreement on a six-month notice.
Id.
31. Id. art. 1907. Article 1907 states:
1. The Parties shall establish a Working Group that shall:
a) seek to develop more effective rules and disciplines concerning
the use of government subsidies;
b) seek to develop a substitute system of rules for dealing with
unfair pricing and government subsidies; and
c) consider any problems that may arise with respect to the implementation of this Chapter and recommend solutions, where
appropriate.
2. The Working Group shall report to the Parties as soon as possible.
The Parties shall use their best efforts to develop and implement
the substitute system of rules within the time limits established in
Article 1906.
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dumping and subsidy/countervailing duties in the multilateral
Uruguay Round in lieu of bilateral talks.
Second, the parties agreed that amendments to either country's AD or CVD laws would be subject to constraints of notification and consultation, and that such amendments would be
consistent with relevant provisions of the GATT, other multilateral accords and the FTA itself.32 Additionally, the parties
agreed to submit proposed legislative changes to a binational
panel for an advisory opinion on the consistency of the changes
33
with existing obligations under international law.
Third, the parties established binational panels to replace
judicial review by domestic courts of final AD or CVD determi32. Id. art. 1902(2). Article 1902(2) states:
Each Party reserves the right to change or modify its antidumping law
or countervailing duty law, provided that in the case of an amendment
to a Party's antidumping or countervailing duty statute:
a) such amendment shall apply to goods from the other Party only
if such application is specified in the amending statute;
b) the amending Party notifies the other Party in writing of the
amending statute as far in advance as possible of the date of enactment of such statute;
c) following notification, the amending Party, upon request of the
other Party, consults with the other Party prior to the enactment
of the amending statute; and
d) such amendment, as applicable to the other Party, is not inconsistent with:
i) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the Antidumping Code), or
the Agreement on the Interpretationand Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (the Subsidies Code), or
ii) the object and purpose of this Agreement and this Chapter,
which is to establish fair and predictable conditions for the
progressive liberalizing of trade between the two countries
while maintaining effective disciplines on unfair trade practices, such object and purpose to be ascertained from the provisions of this Agreement, its preamble and objectives, and the
practices of the Parties.
Id.
33. Id. art. 1903(1). Article 1903(1) states that:
A Party may request in writing that an amendment to the other
Party's antidumping statute or countervailing duty statute be referred
to a panel for a declaratory opinion as to whether:
a) the amendment does not conform to the provisions of subparagraph (d)(i) or (d)(ii) of paragraph 2 of Article 1902; or
b) such amendment has the function and effect of overturning a
prior decision of a panel made pursuant to Article 1904 and does
not conform to the provisions of subparagraph (d)(i) or (d)(ii) of
paragraph 2 of Article 1902. Such declaratory opinion shall have
force or effect only as provided in this Article.
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nations by national agencies.3 4 Each party agreed to retain its
own AD and CVD practices 35 - which were fairly similar in any
case - and to make available binational panels to persons who
would otherwise have been entitled to judicial review under domestic law.36 The panel's mandate is to consider the administrative record of the case challenged and decide generally
whether the final determination has been made in accordance
37
with the applicable domestic law.
Panels are composed of five members chosen from a roster
of trade experts, primarily lawyers, established in each country. 38 Two panelists are selected by each country while the fifth
member is chosen jointly, or, where there is no agreement on the
final member, by lot.3 9 In practice, the fifth member's nationality has alternated between the two countries from one panel to
the next.
The standard of review to be applied by the panel is the
standard applicable in the country where the AD or CVD action
was taken.40 In Canada, the test is whether the agency: (a)
34. Id. art. 1904.
35. Id. art. 1902(1). Article 1902(1) states that:
Each Party reserves the right to apply its antidumping law and countervailing duty law to goods imported from the territory of the other
Party. Antidumping law and countervailing duty law include, as appropriate for each Party, relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice, and judicial precedents.
Id.
36. Id. art. 1904(2). Article 1904(2) states, in pertinent part:
Either Party may request that a panel review, based upon the administrative record, a final antidumping or countervailing duty determination of a competent investigating authority of either Party to
determine whether such determination was in accordance with the antidumping or countervailingduty law of the importing Party....
Id. (emphasis added). Subsection (3) adds that: "[tihe Panel shall apply ... the
general legal principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise would
apply to a review of a determination of the competent investigating authority."
Id. art. 1904(3).
37. Id. art. 1904(2).
38. FTA, supra note 4, Annex 1901.2.
39. Id.
40. Id. art. 1904(3). Article 1904(3) of the FTA states that, "[tihe Panel
shall apply the standard of review described in Article 1911 and the general
legal principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise would apply to a
review of a determination of the competent investigating authority." Id. Article
1911 of the FTA defines the standard of review:
standard of review means the following standards, as may be amended
from time to time by a Party:
a) in the case of Canada, the grounds set forth in section 28(1) of
the FederalCourt Act with respect to all final determinations; and
b) in the case of the United States of America,
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failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted
beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction; (b) erred in law in
making its decision or order, whether or not the error appears on
the face of the record; or (c) based its decision or order on an
erroneous finding of fact that was made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the material before it.4 1 In
the United States, the test is whether the agency's decision is
unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or is other42
wise not in accordance with domestic law.
It is important to note that the panels are not authorized to
create substantive law. Rather, their determinations must be
consistent with the laws of the importing country. 48 Consei) the standard set forth in section 516A(b)(1XB) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended, with the exception of a determination referred to in (ii), and
ii) the standard set forth in section 516A(b)(1)(A) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended, with respect to a determination by
the United States International Trade Commission not to initiate a review pursuant to section 751(b) of the TariffAct of
1930, as amended.
Id. art. 1911.
41. Federal Court Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 28.1 (1985) (Can.). Under NAFTA,
the applicable standard of review is amended and adopted from section 18.1(4)
of the Federal Court Act, which applies the following test,
[whether the agency]:
(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or
refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
(b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural
fairness or other procedure that it was required by law to
observe;
(c) erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not
the error appears on the face of the record;
(d) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that
it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard
for the material before it;
(e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or pejured evidence;
or
(f) acted in any other way that was contrary to law.
Federal Court Act, S.C., ch. F-7 (1985), amended by ch. 8, 1990 S.C. (Can.).
42. The standard of review applicable in the United States is adopted from
section 516A(bXl) of the Tariff Act of 1930. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat.
687 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1988)). See generally
Gary N. Horlick & F. Amanda DeBusk, The Functioningof FTA Dispute Resolution Panels, in NEGOTAnING AND IMPLEMENTING A NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEmENT 1 (Leonard Waverman ed., 1992); Stewart Abercrombie
Baker, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law, in KR. SmMOINns & D.J.
MUSCH, NORTH AMERcAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: DisPuTE SETrLEMENT

(forthcoming, Oceana Publications 1994).
43. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(2). Article 1904(2) states that: "[e]ither
Party may request that a panel review... a final antidumping or countervailing duty determination ... in accordance with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing Party." Id. (emphasis added).
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quently, determinations of dumping and subsidization can be arrived at differently in each country, but the specific
determination will be upheld as long as it was made in accordance with domestic law.
Review of a panel's decision is very limited. There is no appeal mechanism in the FTA to challenge a panel's findings on
the grounds of legal or factual error. However, provision is
made for extraordinary challenges. This provision is invoked
only where: (1) there are allegations of gross misconduct, bias,
serious conflict of interest or other material violation of the rules
of conduct by a panelist, or there is a serious departure from a
fundamental rule of procedure by the panel, or if the action by
the panel is manifestly in excess of its powers, authority or jurisdiction; and (2) any of the actions outlined above materially affected the panel's decision or threatened the integrity of the
review process. 44
Through October 1993, the parties had initiated forty-four
45 Of
Chapter 19 cases and two "extraordinary challenges."
these cases, twenty-eight were directed against U.S. agencies
(i.e., the Department of Commerce (DOC) or the International
Trade Commission (ITC)).46 Eighteen of these cases have been
44. Id. art. 1904(13). Article 1904(13) sets forth the circumstances in
which the extraordinary challenge procedure may be used. FTA Annex 1904.13
details the procedure to be followed in an extraordinary challenge. Id. Annex
1904.13.

45. U.S.-CAN.

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BINATIONAL SECRETARIAT, U.S. SEC-

TION, FTA DIsPUTE SE'rrLEMENT (CHAPTERs 18 & 19) STATUS REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1993 (1993) [hereinafter FTA STATUS REPORT]. The two cases that were
reviewed by an Extraordinary Challenge Committee were: Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Pork from Canada ECC-91-1904-01 USA (June 14, 1991) and Live
Swine from CanadaECC-93-1904-01 USA (Apr. 8, 1993). Id.
46. FTA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45. The following cases have been initiated against U.S. agencies: CertainSoftwood Lumber Products from Canada
USA-92-1904-01 (active); CertainSoftwood Lumber Productsfrom CanadaUSA
92-1904-02 (active); Pure and Alloy Magnesium from CanadaUSA-92-1904-03
(active); Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada USA-92-1904-04 (active);
Magnesium from Canada USA-92-1904-05/06 (active); CertainCold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada USA-93-1904-01 (active); Certain Hot
Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Productsfrom CanadaUSA-93-1904-02 (active); Certain Corrosion-ResistantCarbon Steel Flat Products from Canada USA-931904-03 (active); Certain Cut-To-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada USA93-1904-04 (active); Certain Corrosion-ResistantCarbon Steel Flat Products
from Canada USA-93-1904-05 (active); Red Raspberriesfrom CanadaUSA-891904-01 (Dec. 15, 1989); Replacement Partsfor Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada USA-89-1904-02 (Jan. 25, 1990); Replacement
Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from CanadaUSA-891904-03 (Mar. 7, 1990); Dried, Heavy, Salted Codfish from Canada (terminated); Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment
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completed, while ten remain active. 47 Sixteen cases have been
initiated against Canadian agencies (i.e., Revenue Canada (RC)
or the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT)).4 8 Five of
these cases have been completed, while eleven remain active.
Two of the sixteen cases against Canadian agencies were
launched by a Canadian petitioner, thirteen were launched by
U.S. petitioners, and the remaining case was launched by a U.S.
from Canada USA-89-1904-05 (terminated); Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork
from Canada USA-89-1904-06 (Sept. 28, 1990); New Steel Rail, Except Light
Rail, from Canada USA-89-1904-07 (June 8, 1990); New Steel Rail, Except
Light Rail, from CanadaUSA-89-1904-08 (Aug. 30, 1990); New Steel Railsfrom
Canada USA-89-1904-09/10 (Aug. 13, 1990); Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Porkfrom
CanadaUSA-89-1904-11 (Jan. 22, 1991); Replacement Partsfor Self-Propelled
Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada USA-90-1904-01 (May 15, 1992);
Oil Country Tubular Goods from CanadaUSA-90-1904-02 (terminated); Sheet
Piling from CanadaUSA-90-1904-03 (terminated); Oil Country Tubular Goods
from Canada USA 91-1904-01 (terminated); Iron Construction Castings from
CanadaUSA-91-1904-02 (terminated); Live Swine from Canada USA-91-190403 (May 19, 1992); Live Swine from Canada USA-91-1904-04 (Aug. 26, 1992);
Replacement Partsfor Self-Propelled.Bituminous PavingEquipment from Canada USA-91-1904-05 (terminated). Id.
47. FrA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45.
48.
Id. The following cases have been initiated against Canadian agencies: Certain Machine Tufted Carpeting Originatingin or Exported from the
United States of America CDA-92-1904-01 (active); Certain Machine Tufted
CarpetingOriginatingin or Exported from the United States of America CDA92-1904-02 (active); Gypsum Board Originatingin or Exported from the United
States of America CDA-93-1904-01 (active); Gypsum Board Originatingin or
Exported from the United States of America CDA-93-1904-02 (active); Certain
Hot-Rolled CarbonSteel Plate and High Strength Low Alloy Plate,Heat-Treated
or not, Originatingin or Exported from the United States of America CDA-931904-04 (active); CertainHot-Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet ProductsOriginatingin
or Exportedfrom the United States of America CDA-93-1904-05 (active); Certain
Hot-Rolled CarbonSteel Plate and High Strength Low Alloy Plate,Heat-Treated
or not, Originatingin or Exported from the United States of America CDA-931904-06 (active); and Certain Flat-Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet Products
Originatingin or Exported from the United States of America CDA-93-1904-07
(active); Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet Originatingin or Exported from the
United States of America CDA-93-1904-08 (active); Certain Cold-Rolled Steel
Sheet Originatingin or Exported from the United States of America CDA-931904-09 (active); Certain Solder Joint Pipe FittingsOriginatingin or Exported
from the United States of America CDA-93-1904-10 (active); Polyphase Induction Motors from the United States CDA-90-1904-01 (Sept. 11, 1991); Certain
Beer Originatingin or Exported from the United States of America by G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst Brewing Company and the Stroh Brewery
Company for Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia CDA-911904-01 (Aug. 6, 1992); CertainBeer Originatingin or Exportedfrom the United
States of America by G. HeilemanBrewing Company, Inc., Pabst Brewing Company and the Stroh Brewery Company for Use or Consumption in the Provinceof
British Columbia CDA-91-1904-02 (Feb. 8, 1993); and Tomato Paste in Containers Larger than 100 Fluid Ounces, Originatingin or Exported from the United
States of America CDA-93-1904-03 (terminated). Id.
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producer and several Canadian importers. 4 9 All of the cases
against U.S. agencies were brought by Canadian petitioners,
although in six of these cases U.S. petitioners were also present.5 0 Overall, Canadians have been the major users of Chapter
19 procedures, and the main respondents have been U.S. agencies. However, there has been a sharp rise in the number of
cases initiated against Canadian agencies over the past year, totalling ten new cases launched.
The results of Chapter 19 actions are that just less than half
that were reviewed by a panel (and not terminated) resulted in a
remand in whole or in part;5 1 that is, the determination was returned to the agency for "action not inconsistent with the panel's
decision."5 2 In the five Canadian cases completed, the actions of
the agency were affirmed in one panel and remanded in two
others, while the final two were terminated by the parties., 3 For
the completed U.S. cases, seven were remanded, four were affirmed, and seven were terminated.5 4 Excluding terminated
49. FTA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45. The two cases launched by Canadian petitioners against negative injury findings by the CITT are: Certain HotRolled CarbonSteel Plate and High Strength Low Alloy Plate,Heat-Treated or
not, Originating in or Exported from the United States of America CDA-931904-06; and Certain FlatHot-Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet Products Originating
in or Exported from the United States of America CDA-93-1904-07. Id.
50. FTA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45. U.S. petitioners were present in
the following six cases: CertainSoftwood Lumber Productsfrom Canada USA92-1904-01 (May 6, 1993); Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous
Paving Equipment from CanadaUSA-89-1904-02 (Jan. 25, 1990); Replacement
Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from CanadaUSA-891904-03 (Mar. 7, 1990); Replacement Partsfor Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from CanadaUSA-89-1904-05 (Mar. 7, 1990); New Steel Rails
from Canada USA-89-1904-09/10 (Aug. 13, 1990); and Replacement Parts for
Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada USA-90-1904-01
(May 24, 1990). Id.
51. See FTA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45.
52. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(8).
53. FTA STATUS

REPORT,

supra note 45. These cases are: Polyphase Induc-

tion Motors from the U.S. CDA-89-1904-01 (terminated); Integral Horsepower
Induction Motors CDA-90-1904-01 (Sept. 11, 1991) (affirmed); Certain Beer
Originatingin or Exported from the United States of America by G. Heileman
Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst Company and the Stroh Brewery Company for
Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia CDA-91-1904-01 (Aug.
6, 1992) (remanded); Certain Beer Originatingin or Exported from the United
States of America by G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst Brewing Company and the Stroh Brewery Company for Use or Consumptionin the Province of
British Columbia CDA-91-1904-02 (Feb. 8, 1993) (remanded); and Tomato
Paste in ContainersLarger than 100 Fluid Ounces, Originatingin or Exported
from the United States of America (terminated). Id.
54. FTA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45. Cases can be remanded in whole
or in part, hence a "remand" may be a relatively insignificant action. The seven
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cases, approximately similar results in the United States were
produced by the Court of International Trade in the period prior
to the FTA.
On balance, the judgment of many jurists is that the Chapter 19 panel process has worked effectively. In a lengthy review
of dispute settlement in the first two years of the FTA, Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld of New York University wrote that: "[a]ll
things considered, the unique binational dispute settlement
mechanisms created by the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement have worked extraordinarily well." 5 5 In particular,
Lowenfeld notes that the panels have conscientiously applied
the law of the country in which the case arose. 56 Panel decisions
have not reflected a bias for or against trade remedy legislation.
Most important, panels have not reflected nationalistic behavior, for panelists usually have dealt objectively with legal issues
and have not attempted to push a Canadian or American approach to the cases.
Given the success of the FTA Chapter 19 mechanism, it
must be given serious consideration as a means of dealing with
AD and CVDs in other trade agreements. The extension of
Chapter 19 to Mexico in NAFTA provides a useful case study of
how this might be achieved and the problems which might be
encountered.
III. AD AND CVDs UNDER NAFTA
Like Canada in the FTA negotiations, Mexico aimed to
achieve greater and more secure access to the U.S. market by
following U.S. cases were remanded in whole or in part to the U.S. agency: Red
Raspberries from Canada USA-89-1904-01; Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork
from CanadaUSA-89-1904-06; New Steel Rail,Except Light Rail, from Canada
USA-89-1904-07; Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada USA-89-1904-11;
Replacement Partsfor Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving USA-90-1904-01; Live
Swine from Canada USA-91-1904-03; and Live Swine from Canada USA-911904-04. Id. The four following cases were affirmed: Replacement Parts for
Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada USA-89-1904-02;
Replacement Partsfor Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada;New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, from CanadaUSA-89-1904-08; and New
Steel Rails from Canada USA-89-1904-09/10. Id.
55. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement under Chapters
18 and'19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal (paper prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States,
December 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Journal
of Global Trade).
56. Id.
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negotiating a NAFTA with the United States and Canada.5 7 In
recent years, Mexico has increasingly found itself at the receiving end of U.S. AD actions.5 8 Between 1980 and 1990, eight AD
actions were initiated by U.S. companies against Mexican producers.5 9 In seeking to address the issue of trade remedies in
NAFTA, the parties turned to the Chapter 19 mechanism.
However, even though the dispute settlement mechanism in
Chapter 19 of the FTA has worked well in a bilateral context
between Canada and the United States, it was not necessarily
suitable for NAFTA. There were a variety of obstacles and concerns raised by the possible extension of the FTA's dispute settlement mechanism to Mexico. Before delving into the issues
that were raised by the question of extending a Chapter 19
mechanism to NAFTA, it is useful to briefly consider the nature
of Mexico's unfair trade remedy system as it existed prior to
NAFTA. 60

MICHAEL HART, A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE
126-27 (1990).
58. Stephen J. Powell et al., CurrentAdministration of U.S. Antidumping
and CountervailingDuty Laws: Implications for Prospective U.S.-Mexico Free
Trade Talks, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 177, 179 (1990). Mexico has not encountered the same problem with U.S. CVD actions as Canada has, because it
signed the "Understanding on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties" with the
United States in 1986. Pursuant to its obligations under the Agreement, Mexico substantially altered its subsidy practice. See Celia R. Siac, Does Mexico
Subsidize too Much? Perceptions versus Reality, 36 C.D. HowE INST. COMMENTARY 6 (1992).
59. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N ANN. REP. (1980-1989). These include: Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Argentina, Mexico, Poland, and Spain, I.T.C. investigations 731-TA-157 through 160 (preliminary) and 701-TA-209 (preliminary)
(1983); Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and
Spain, I.T.C. investigations 701-TA-215 through 217 (preliminary) and 731-TA191 through 731-TA-195 (preliminary) (1984); Welded Steel Wire Fabric,for
Concrete Reinforcementfrom Italy, Mexico, and Venezuela, I.T.C. investigations
701-TA-261(A), 263(A), and 264(A) (preliminary) and 731-TA-289(A) through
291(A) (preliminary) (1986); Porcelain-On-SteelCooking Ware from Mexico, the
People's Republic of China, and Taiwan, I.T.C. investigations 701-TA-265 (final) and 731-297-299 (final) (1986); Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Peru,
Kenya, and Mexico, I.T.C. investigations 303-TA-18 (final) and 731-TA-332 and
333 (final) (1987); PortlandHydraulicCement and Cement Clinkerfrom Columbia, France, Greece, Japan, Mexico Republic of Korea, Spain, and Venezuela,
I.T.C. investigation 731-TA-365 through 363 (preliminary)(1986); Certain Steel
Pails from Mexico, I.T.C. investigation 731-TA-435 (preliminary) (1986). Id.
60. As of this writing in December 1993, and as part of the legislative implementation of NAFTA, Mexico is amending its AD and CVD legislation to
conform to its obligations under Chapter 19 of NAFTA, and especially Annex
1904.15 Schedule B.
57.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA
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AD AND CVD SYSTEM

Mexico's pre-NAFTA legislation governing AD and CVD actions consisted of The Foreign Trade Regulatory Act 6 1 (Act) and
62
Regulations Against Unfair International Trade Practices
(Regulations). The agency responsible for AD and CVD actions
under that legislation was the Secretariade Comercio y Fomento
Industrial(SECOFI), a division of the budget and finance ministry, with the Comisi6n de Aranceles y Controles al Comercio Exterior (CACCE) 63 providing consultative support particularly on
the issue of duty assessments.
SECOFI was empowered to conduct up to two investigations
leading to provisional duty assessments and a third culminating
in a final determination.6 4 In order to make a positive finding,
SECOFI had to determine that an unfair practice (dumping or
subsidization) existed in conjunction with injury to the domestic
industry. 65 Mexican importers could appeal final affirmative determinations to SECOFI in order to obtain revocation of the
finding, or appeal further to the Federal Fiscal Tribunal (FFT)
for judicial review. 66 In addition, the Mexican Constitution provided a supplemental remedy known as amparo by which the
constitutionality of the administrative action could be challenged before the Federal Judicial Courts.6 7 The significance of
61. Decreto por el que se Crea la Ley Reglamentaria del Artdulo 131 de la
Constituci6n Poltica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en Materia de Corercio
Exterior, D.O., Jan. 13, 1986 [hereinafter Act]. The source of the translation is
the GATT Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, as reproduced in REVIEW OF
TRADE & INVESTMENT BY MEXICO, 1990 USITC REP. 2275, at 4-13 [hereinafter
USITC REPORT].

62. Reglamento Contra Prdcticas Desleales del Comercio Internacional,
D.O., Nov. 25, 1987 [hereinafter Regulations].
63. CACCE has been translated as the Committee on Foreign Trade Tariffs
and Controls. Ernesto Rubio del Cueto, CountervailingDuties Affecting United
States-Mexican Trade, 12 Hous. J. IN'L L. 323, 325-26 (1990).
64. Act, supra note 61, ch. II, arts. 11-14.
65. Id., arts. 14-15; Regulations, supra note 62, ch. V, art. 12. "Injury" is
defined in Article 1(VIII), Chapter I of the Regulations as:
the loss or impairment of a national asset or the closure of access to
any licit, normal gain which one or several domestic producers representing a significant part of national production, suffer or may suffer
as an immediate and direct consequence of any of the unfair international trade practices envisaged in Article 7 of the Act and in the Regulations. This concept includes impediments to the establishment of
new industries or to further development of existing industries as a
direct result of unfair international practices.
Regulations, supra note 62, ch. 1, art. 1(VIII).
66. Act, supra note 61, ch. III, art. 24.
67. TRADE PoLIcY REVIEw MECHANISM: MEXICO, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFs & TRADE 102 (1993).
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the amparo procedure and remedy will be discussed in greater
68
detail below.
Mexico's AD provisions have been invoked often since 1987.
Between 1987 and 1989, Mexico initiated thirty-five AD proceedings, fifteen of which were against U.S. imports. 6 9 The majority of cases against the United States were initiated in 1987:
only two were initiated in 1988 and 1989 each, thus indicating a
decline in their initiation. 70 Mexico's CVD provisions have been
invoked considerably less than AD actions, as is the case with
most nations.

B. TECHNICAL IsSUES RAISED BY INCORPORATING MEXICO INTO
A CHAPTER 19

From an organizational perspective, there were both technical and substantive concerns raised by the potential extension of
Chapter 19 to Mexico. The first technical concern was that the
FTA Chapter 19 mechanism was drafted in a bilateral context
rather than in a trilateral context. This raised the question of
whether the mechanism would be amended to reflect trinational
as opposed to binational review. Such an amendment could
have taken a number of forms. For example, one option involved
binational review by the parties directly involved in the dispute
with the third party having a right to participate in the hearing
as a litigant, but without national representation on the panel.
This option required relatively minor changes to the current
structure and functioning of the Chapter 19 mechanism. An alternate option involved trinational panel review, but that option
may not have been as appealing because it effectively required
that a non-party to the dispute would be involved in the reviewing process. This involvement could conceivably complicate
rather than facilitate the decision-making process. In the end,
binational dispute resolution was negotiated into NAFTA.
The second and third technical issues were more serious
and involved Mexico's Constitution. The second technical concern raised by the potential extension of Chapter 19 to Mexico
was that Mexico's adherence to the Calvo doctrine might render
recourse to binational panels invalid under Mexican law. The
Calvo doctrine provides that where legal disputes arise between
national and foreign business partners, domestic remedies
68. See infra text accompanying notes 74-80.
69. USITC REPORT, supra note 61, at 4-17.
70. Id.
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should be used to the exclusion of international ones. 7 1 Some
Latin American states, including Mexico, have adopted a provision in their constitution requiring foreigners who have been
granted certain commercial rights to abstain from seeking the
protection of their governments where a dispute concerning
those rights arises. 72 Because the binational panels provided for
in the Chapter 19 mechanism might be perceived as granting a
form of protection by a foreign government, there was a technical concern that recourse to these panels might not be valid
under Mexican law. 73 Apparently, the Calvo clause in the Mexican Constitution did not pose a real threat to adopting binational review under NAFTA and was effectively dealt with early
on in the Chapter 19 negotiations. However, because so many
Latin American states incorporate a form of the Calvo clause in
their constitutions, this issue could be raised in the context of
extending NAFTA throughout the Western Hemisphere.
The third technical problem raised by the potential extension of Chapter 19 to Mexico involved Mexico's writ of amparo.
The writ of amparois a legal device which provides for a process
and remedy to redress violations of constitutionally protected individual rights by an "authority" which has caused a party injury. 74 Article 103 of Mexico's Constitution establishes the

71. Dr. James C. Baker & Lois J. Yoder, ICSID and the Calvo Clause a
Hindrance to Foreign Direct Investment in the LDCs, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 75, 75 (1989). Two cardinal principles constitute the core of the Calvo
Doctrine:

First, that sovereign states, being free and independent, enjoy the
right, on the basis of equality, to freedom from 'interference of any sort'
by other states, whether it be by force or diplomacy, and second,
that aliens are not entitled to rights and privileges not accorded to nationals, and that therefore they may seek redress for grievances only
before the local authorities.
...

DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALvo CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND IN-

TERNATIONAL LAW AND

DwLOmAcy 19 (1955).

72. See MEx. CONST. art. 27, pt. I. Article 27 provides:
The State may grant the same right to foreigners [vis., the right to
acquire ownership of lands, waters, or to obtain concessions for the exploration of mines or waters], provided they agree before the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to consider themselves as nationals in respect to
such property, and bind themselves not to invoke the protection of
their governments in matters relating thereto....

Id.
73. SHEA, supra note 71, at 5-6.
74. For a useful discussion of amparo, see Hector Fix Zamudo, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9 CAL. W. INVL. L.J. 306 (1979).

1994]

ANIDUMPiNG A

COUNTERVAILING

Dw'rs

75 while a lengthy
controversies subject to an amparo proceeding,
76
operation.
its
Article 107 regulates
There appeared to be two possible implications of this device
for the incorporation of binational review into NAFTA. First,
amparo may have been used to challenge the rights of foreigners
to participate in a binational review, owing to the limits placed
77
on those rights under Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution.
If a court were to find the law establishing binational review unconstitutional, it could conceivably have invalidated the specific
panel decision against which the amparo process was invoked,
78
but not strike the law down generally.
The second implication of amparo for binational review involved recourse to amparofor violations of individual procedural
and substantive rights during the course of administrative proceedings. In the context of unfair trade remedies, amparo might
have provided recourse to Mexican importers for infringements
by SECOFI of individual rights - as established under Article
14 of the Constitution - where all other remedies have been
exhausted. 79 In such cases, administrative reviews by binational panels of SECOFI's final determinations could have been
subjected to further review by the Federal Judicial Courts,

75. Max. CONST. art. 103. Article 103 states:
The federal courts shall decide all controversies that arise:
I. Out of law or acts of the authorities that violate individual
guarantees,
II. Because of laws or acts of the federal authority restricting or
encroaching on the sovereignty of the States,
III. Because of laws or acts of State authorities that invade the
sphere of federal authority.
Id.
76. Article 107 of the Mexican Constitution provides that all controversies
mentioned in Article 103 are subject to trial in amparo and amparo can be invoked in criminal, administrative, civil, and labor matters. Id. art. 107.
77. See supra note 72.
78. The writ of amparo provides individual and not general relief. Article
107 of the Mexican Constitution provides:
The judgment shall always be such that it affects only private individuals, being limited to affording them redress and protection in the special case to which the complaint refers, without making any general
declaration as to the law or act on which the complaint is based.
MEX. CONST. art. 107, pt. II.
79. Id. art. 14. Article 14 states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, possessions, or
rights without a trial by a duly created court in which the essential
formalities of procedure are observed and in accordance with laws issued prior to the act.
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thereby resulting in panel decisions being overturned through
domestic judicial procedures.
A further concern in the NAFTA context was that recourse
by way of an amparo process appeared to be limited to those who
suffered an injury directly.8 0 In the context of trade remedy procedures, this meant effectively Mexican importers as they would
be the parties required to pay the duties imposed by SECOFI.
Thus, foreign exporters or producers could possibly be excluded
from recourse to amparo. Furthermore, the grounds for review
in an amparo action are not very transparent. This would make
it difficult for foreign nationals to understand how the mechanism works and how the law is applied.
Finally, the most important concern for binational review is
that the amparo process could have undermined the finality of
panel decisions. Because the right to petition review of an administrative decision under amparo is constitutionally entrenched, it would seem that a party meeting the basic
requirements necessary to invoke amparocannot be denied that
remedy. If this is the case, then decisions by binational panels
could have been subject to review by a superior domestic court if
they were considered to be an "authority" whose decisions may
have been challenged through amparo. Consequently, one of the
primary purposes of the binational panel - to be the final arbiter in an AD or CVD dispute - would have been undermined.
C.

SUBSTANTrVE IssuEs RAISED BY INCORPORATING MEXICO

INTO A CHAPTER 19

The success of the FTA Chapter 19 mechanism is primarily
attributable to the fact that Canada and the United States share
similar legal traditions and unfair trade remedy systems. One
of the challenges in extending Chapter 19 to NAFTA is that the
parties do not share a common legal tradition. Mexico's legal
system is based on the civil law, whereas Canada and the
United States have systems based on the common law.
Although a general comparison between Mexican civil law and
the common law in Canada and the United States is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is sufficient for our present purposes to
suggest that the approach to the application and interpretation

80. A trial in amparo shall always be held at the instance of the injured
party. Id. art. 107, pt. I.
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of law in each of these systems is conceptually different and ulti1
mately results in a disparity between the two systems.8
A major concern as to whether a Chapter 19-like mechanism was suitable for NAFTA involved differences between the
manner of conducting administrative proceedings in Mexico
compared to the procedure in the United States and Canada. In
the United States and Canada, it is considered extremely important that procedural safeguards are incorporated into the structure and regulations governing the conduct of an administrative
agency in order to protect individuals from potential abuse of
state authority. A superior body's review of an administrative
body's decision to determine whether it was made in accordance
with the law can include either a finding as to whether the
agency acted outside the scope of its powers, or whether it
breached a procedural requirement, thereby affecting an individual's right to due process or natural justice.
As indicated earlier, the essence of Chapter 19 is that it requires a binational panel to assess whether an agency made its
determination in accordance with domestic law.8 2 Consequently, if specific procedural safeguards governing the conduct
of an agency's investigation and duty assessments are not incorporated into one party's administrative system, the result is a
lower value of binational review for all parties involved in a dispute. In Canada and the United States there are generally high
standards of transparency, due process and structural safeguards to guarantee an absence of bias in the decision-making
process. These standards are incorporated into the conduct of
administrative proceedings and ensure that decisions are made
in a quasi-judicial manner. Mexico's different standards of
transparency, due process, and structural safeguards appeared
to have serious implications for binational review.

81. For example, while law is created under the common law by judges interpreting legislation in conjunction with cases establishing legal precedents,
the civil law tradition is rule based, with limited authority given to judges to
actually impose their own interpretation on the legislation. Civil law judges
look at the text of specific rules to determine whether the text applies to a specific fact situation. Under the common law, judges have the power to modify or
add to the law through the application of specific rules of interpretation. See
Fernando Orrantia, Conceptual Differences Between the Civil Law System and
the Common Law System, 19 Sw. U. L. REv. 1161, 1164-65 (1990).
82. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904.
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Transparency

Transparency is a key element of the law governing the conduct of Canadian and U.S. administrative bodies. The standard
of transparency in Canada and the United States generally requires that the law applicable to an administrative agency be set
down in a clear and concise fashion and be accessible to the public. Furthermore, the agency's conduct in performing its duties
must be evident in order that its practice can be properly reviewed by a superior body to determine whether the agency ful83
filled its duties in accordance with the law.
These standards were not inherent aspects of Mexico's preNAFTA unfair trade law administration. Mexico's system was
characterized by very general rules and regulations providing
SECOFI with broad discretionary powers to perform its duties.
SECOFI's broad powers of discretion emanated in part from the
fact that limited transparency existed in how SECOFrs investigations and determinations of unfair trade practices were actually carried out. Two examples highlight the absence of
transparency and its implications for the standard of judicial review under a Chapter 19-like mechanism.
First, SECOFI's time frame for conducting its investigation
and making its dumping, subsidy or injury assessments did not
reflect the time frame envisioned by the Act and Regulations.
According to the law, SECOFI was required to initiate an investigation within five days of receipt of a petition that complied
with the regulatory requirements.8 If SECOFI found sufficient
evidence to sustain an initial determination of dumping or subsidization and injury, a first provisional duty could be imposed,
also within five days of receipt of the petition.8 5 If SECOFI
made such a determination, a second investigation would be
conducted after which a revised assessment regarding the appropriate amount of the duty would be made, taking into account the results of the investigation to date, as well as
83. For example, in Canadian and U.S. AD and CVD actions, the agency is
obliged to complete an administrative record (AR) of the evidence provided by
counsel for the parties in a case. Decisions of the agency must be substantiated
by the evidence in the AR. A reviewing court (or a binational panel) will scrutinize the same evidence used by the agency (i.e., the AR), and if it finds that the
agency's decision cannot be substantiated by evidence, the action can be remanded to the agency.
84. Regulations, supra note 62, ch. VI, art. 13. SECOFI may also commence an investigation at its own initiative pursuant to ch. VI, art. 15. Id.
85. Act, supra note 61, ch. II, art. 11.
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information provided by any interested parties.8 6 This second
provisional duty determination was to be made within thirty
days of the commencement of the investigation.8 7 According to
the Act, a final determination was to be made within six months
of the initial duty determination. 8
In reality, SECOFI's practice did not reflect this process.
SECOFI usually launched a formal investigation within three
months of receiving a petition, and required at least a week
(although it could take as long as a month) before a first provisional assessment was made.8 9 The extension of deadlines was
widespread throughout Mexico's unfair trade law administration. Consequently, although SECOFI was required to complete
its investigation within six months, it usually took between fifteen and eighteen months for completion once the proceedings
were initiated, or eighteen to twenty-one months from the filing
date.90
A second problem with transparency in Mexico's trade administration related to the compilation of the administrative
record. Because there were no explicit provisions in the Regulations outlining what should constitute the administrative record, SECOFI could effectively determine what should or should
not be included in the written record. This use of discretion
meant that the compiled record would often be inadequate for
the purposes of judicial review under a Chapter 19-like mechanism. A detailed record of an agency's actions is central to a
review process. Without a proper record, a binational panel cannot effectively review an agency's practices and determine
whether the challenged order was dealt with properly at the
lower stages of the investigation or in the assessment of the
amount of the duty.
The absence of a sufficient degree of transparency in an
agency's governing legislation and practice might adversely affect a party's interests. Uncertainty as to the time-frame for
SECOFI's investigations and duty assessments might also impair the ability of parties to prepare properly for participation in
86. Id. ch. II, art. 12.
87. Id.
88. Id. art. 13.
89. USITC REPORT, supra note 61, at 4-13, 4-14.
90. Id. Regarding time frame, it appears that SECOFI's actual practice is
more liberal than its written regulations. However, SECOFI's practice disadvantaged exporters by creating legal uncertainty about deadlines and, where
procedures drag on extensively, by requiring exporters to pay duties while making a final determination.
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the investigative and assessment process, as well as for payment
of the duty. Moreover, parties might be unable to criticize an
agency for unfair treatment where the agency appears to have
acted within its broad discretionary powers. This problem could
be compounded by the fact that an absence of clear guidelines
governing the compilation of the administrative record means
that a superior body could not fully know how an agency performed its duties. Therefore, it could not assess properly
whether an agency's actions met certain procedural standards
intended to protect individuals from an abuse of agency power.
2.

Due Process

SECOFI's non-adherence to the deadlines as envisioned by
the Regulations raised another major concern about the extension of Chapter 19 in terms of the standard of due process in
Mexico's unfair trade law administration. Due process requires
that individuals whose interests are affected by an administrative action are given adequate notice of the action and a sufficient opportunity to respond to it. However, under the terms of
Chapter 19, Mexico's practice was problematic in two respects.
First, binational panels must apply written law, and Mexico's
law was inconsistent with that of Canada and the United States.
Second, the discrepancy between Mexico's written law and practice created a perception of arbitrary procedures.
In the United States, the analogous remedy to the imposition of a first provisional duty under Mexico's Regulations requires the posting of a cash bond, deposit or other form of
security for the importation of each allegedly subsidized or
dumped product once an affirmative preliminary determination
has been made.9 1 Given the time frames for making a preliminary determination, such security would only be required at
least eighty-five days after the filing of a CVD petition or 160
days in the case of an AD petition. Canada usually makes its
preliminary determinations within ninety days, at which time it
may impose provisional duties or cause security to be posted by
the importer. 92 Both of these situations allow the affected industry to participate to some extent in the investigation and assessment of the provisional duty.
A clear example of the lower standard of due process in
Mexico's system is reflected by the time frame established in the
91. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(d)(2), 1673b(d)(2) (1988).
92. Special Imports Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15 (1985), amended by
S.C., ch. 65, § 26(1) (1988) (Can.).

1994]

ANTIDUmPING AND COUNTERVAILING

Duims

Act and the Regulations for SECOFI to conduct its investigations and make its determinations. As stated earlier, SECOFI
was required to initiate an investigation within five days of receiving a petition in compliance with regulatory requirements. 9 3
Yet, the Act also contemplated the application of a first provisional duty within five days of the initiation of the investigation. 94 SECOFI was required to notify the complainant and
respondent of its decision to initiate an investigation 95 and also
to publish its first provisional duty determination in the Diario
Oficial.9 6 The legislation, moreover, contemplated simultaneous
notice of the initiation of the investigation and the imposition of
a provisional duty. 97 Given the timeframes and the notice requirements, a Mexican importer or a foreign exporter could have
been left unaware of the initiation of an investigation until the
first provisional duty was imposed. 9 s Consequently, an importer could have been required by law to pay a duty without
having any opportunity to participate in the assessment of the
first provisional duty. Moreover, SECOFI calculated the appropriate amount of the first provisional duty on information obtained from international data banks and not on data from
either importers or producers of the goods at issue.9 9 Thus, the
dumping margin or subsidy calculation was also not very
accurate.
Another issue of due process which could have threatened
the viability of the Chapter 19 mechanism in NAFTA was that
under the Act only importers had standing to appeal an affirmative finding of an unfair trade practice. 10 0 Thus, Canadian and
U.S. exporters were unable to appeal decisions by SECOFI and,
therefore, would have been unable to request binational review
under a Chapter 19 mechanism.
3.

Structural Safeguards

Another element important to the common law notion of effective judicial review is the requirement that administrative
agencies act independently or semi-independently of the govern93. See supra note 84.
94. Act, supra note 61, art. 11.
95. Regulations, supra note 62, ch. VI, art. 13.
96. Id. ch. VI, art. 18. The DiarioOficial is Mexico's equivalent to the Canada Gazette and the FederalRegister in the United States.
97. Id. ch. VI, art. 16.
98. USITC REPORT, supra note 61, at 4-13, 4-14.
99. Id. at 4-14.
100. Act, supra note 61, ch. III, art. 24.
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ment. In the case of AD and CVD determinations, this independence is necessary in order to de-politicize the process and to
ensure greater objectivity in agencies' decisions. In addition, it
is considered important that dumping and subsidy assessments
and injury determinations be made by two different agencies in
order to prevent potential bias in the final decision.
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) are independent
bodies responsible for material injury determinations. 10 1 Moreover, their final determinations are made independently of the
dumping or subsidy findings by the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the
Assessment Programs Division of Revenue Canada (RC). The
roles of the CITT, ITC and ITA are both investigative and adjudicative. Although the ITA is a branch of the DOC, it acts in a
quasi-judicial manner independent of the DOC. Revenue Canada's situation is somewhat different. It does not technically
conform to the requirement of semi-independence, because it is
more closely connected with the federal revenue department, a
fact that has been criticized by the United States. However, its
determinations are subject to judicial review similar to injury
findings of the CITT and are, therefore, acceptable. In spite of
RC's unique situation, the independence or semi-independence
of the agencies responsible for dumping and subsidy determinations is still considered an important quality for effective judicial
review.
As indicated above, dumping and subsidy determinations as
well as injury findings were made in Mexico by SECOFI, which
is effectively a branch of the Mexican Department of Commerce.
The determinations were influenced by the Comisi6n de
Aranceles y Controles al Comercio Exterior (CACCE), 10 2 an interagency working group consisting of officials from SECOFI
and other executive agencies. The CACCE advised SECOFI on
the level of duty to be applied as well as the content of SECOFI's
final determination regarding the investigated merchandise.
Consequently, SECOFI's determinations were made neither independently nor semi-independently from the government.
Moreover, dumping and subsidy determinations were not necessarily made independently of injury assessments. Given these
101. In Canada, preliminary injury determinations are in fact made by Revenue Canada, whereas in the United States, both the preliminary and final injury determinations are made by the ITC.
102. See supra note 63.
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facts, there was a concern that SECOFI's findings on injury
might be either politically influenced or substantially affected by
its findings in a dumping or subsidy investigation. However,
there appears to be no express provision in NAFTA Annex
1904.15 requiring Mexico to adopt a structure similar to that of
Canada and the United States.
4. Trade Law Administration
In addition to the factors discussed above, there were specific elements of Mexico's unfair trade law administration that
were less favorable to affected parties than the equivalent Canadian and U.S. provisions. In Mexico, the proceedings culminating in a final determination were in practice considerably longer
than in Canada and the United States. In the United States, a
final determination must be made between 205 and 300 days
after a countervailing duty petition is filed, or between 280 and
420 days after the filing of an antidumping petition. 10 3 In Canada, the CITT must make its final determination within 120
days after receiving notice of the preliminary determination
from Revenue Canada. 10 4 As indicated earlier, in Mexico, the
complete process, culminating in a final determination, usually
took from eighteen to twenty-one months from the date the petition was filed. 10 5 The length of the proceedings had an impact
on interested parties in Mexico in part because once a preliminary dumping or subsidy determination was made and a provisional duty was imposed, the affected importers had to pay the
duty until it was either finalized or revoked. This would have
been costly and detrimental to both importers and foreign exporters, especially where the preliminary finding was found to
be unsubstantiated in subsequent investigations.
D.

SuMMARY

Without transparency in laws and proceedings, high standards of due process, and the independence or semi-independence of administrative bodies, judicial review is hollow and
ineffective. SECOFI's broad discretionary powers which resulted from the lack of transparency in Mexico's unfair trade law
administration created the potential for interested parties and
103.

19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1671d, 1673b, 1673d (1988). See USITC

REPORT,

supra note 61, at 4-16.
104. Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15 (1985), amended by S.C.,
ch. 65, § 43(1) (1988) (Can.).
105. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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the government to influence SECOFrs deadlines and duty assessments. Without the incorporation of higher standards into
the conduct of Mexico's trade law administration, a Chapter 19
dispute settlement mechanism in NAFTA would not have been
suitable.
The differences between Mexico's unfair trade system and
that of Canada and the United States were not ultimately a barrier to extending Chapter 19 to NAFTA. However, the lack of
experience of Mexican and American/Canadian lawyers and administrators with each other's legal system will doubtless generate some problems of adaptation in the early Chapter 19 panels
involving effectiveness of the panel process in Mexico. 10 6 No formal transitional period was incorporated into the NAFTA Chapter 19 to ensure that lawyers and officials familiarize
themselves with foreign procedures of judicial review, nor was
there any similar transition period in the Canada-U.S. FTA. It
appears likely that some time will pass before Mexican jurists,
in particular, will have an opportunity to fully incorporate the
changes to Mexico's unfair trade remedy rules and administration required under NAFTA.
IV.

INCORPORATING THE CHAPTER 19 MECHANISM
INTO NAFTA

As discussed above, Mexico's pre-NAFTA AD and CVD system differed substantially from that of Canada and the United
States. Yet, the underlying compatibility of Canadian and
American legislation and administrative practices was the basis
for negotiating a binational dispute settlement mechanism into
the FTA. In negotiating a similar mechanism in NAFTA, some
basic accommodation on the part of Mexico was clearly required
in order to maintain the standards of judicial review and due
process inherent in the FTA mechanism. This same choice will
face other parties seeking to accede to NAFTA.
In light of this situation, some important changes in Chapter 19 were required to ensure that Mexico's trade remedy system was sufficiently similar to that of Canada and the United
States. Where this was not possible, or where (as in the case of
amparo)the operation of the Mexican legal system appeared uncertain to Mexico's trading partners, it was important to ensure
that adequate remedial provisions were incorporated into the
106. Peter Morici, Trade Talks with Mexico: A Time for Realism 38 (April
1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global
Trade) (forthcoming 1994).
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Agreement to protect the other parties. The rationale underlying
these changes is that Chapter 19 presupposes that a binational
panel will apply the domestic law of the party whose agency's
determination is being challenged. Where a party's administrative procedures, statutes, or standard of judicial review do not
match, or at least come close to, those found in the other parties'
unfair trade remedy systems, interested nationals of those other
parties may not receive a standard of due process equivalent to
that extended by their governments to foreign exporters.
There were three important changes negotiated to Chapter
19 to allow Mexico, Canada and the United States to reach
agreement in NAFTA. First, the parties included in NAFTA a
section outlining desirable qualities for the administration of antidumping and countervailing duty laws. 10 7 Second, the parties
included a section that outlines a series of twenty obligatory
amendments to Mexico's unfair trade remedy regime which
would make the Mexican system more compatible with that of
Canada and the United States.10 8 The proposed amendments
are mainly procedural, and are intended to address the low standards of due process that are characteristic of Mexico's unfair
trade remedy legislation. 10 9 For example, there are requirements that Mexican legislation shall provide explicit timetables
for administrative proceedings, full participation in the administrative process for interested parties, and timely access to all
non-confidential information. 110 Mexico must change its law
that allows for the imposition of duties only five days after receipt of a petition. In addition, Mexico must expand its recognition of parties having standing to request judicial review to
include foreign producers and exporters who were formerly excluded from seeking such review of an agency's determination.
Perhaps most importantly, Mexico is required to compile a comprehensive administrative record of the proceedings of the investigating agency and a detailed statement of legal reasoning
underlying the agency determination. This record and state107. For example, "publish notice of initiation of investigations," and "provide disclosure of relevant information... [including]... an explanation of the
calculation or the methodology used to determine the margin of dumping or the
amount of subsidy," and so forth. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1907(3).
108. Id. Annex 1904.15(d), pt. B.
109. It should be recalled that the provision of due process in unfair trade
remedy practice is a relatively recent phenomenon in Canada and the United
States. Furthermore, it is probable that Mexico provided greater due process in
practice than required by Mexican law.
110. NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex 1904.15(d), pt. B.
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ment would then become the basis for judicial review by a binational panel.
Third, under the title of "Safeguarding the Panel Review
System," the parties included a section in NAFTA which provides remedies if a party does not comply with its obligations
under Chapter 19.111 Specifically, if the application of a party's
domestic law prevents a binational panel from carrying out its
functions, NAFTA provides recourse to consultation and then to
a Special Committee of three individuals selected from the same
roster used for the purpose of establishing Extraordinary Challenge Committees. 1 2 If the Committee finds that a party has
not complied with Chapter 19, then the complaining party can
suspend binational panel review or equivalent "appropriate"
benefits with respect to that party. 113 Article 1905 further provides that binational panel reviews between the disputing Parties will be stayed,"14 and will revert to domestic courts if
necessary;"15 and gives the party complained against rights to
retaliate in kind to a suspension of binational panel review by
the complaining party. 1 6 In the event the party initially complained against removes the cause for complaint, provision is
made to reconvene a Special Committee to assess the situation
117
and then terminate counter-measures, if appropriate.
Given the successful history of Chapter 19 in the FTA, it is
unlikely that a Special Committee would arise between Canada
and the United States, but it may form a useful sanction to ensure that Mexico (or any other country acceding to NAFTA)
adopts the domestic practices necessary to implement Chapter
19. However, it is unlikely that the extension of Chapter 19 to
Mexico could survive any substantial use of Article 1905, since
such use would essentially signal a breakdown of the undertakings of Chapter 19 itself.

111. Id. art. 1905.
112. Id. Extraordinary Challenge Committees were provided for in the FTA
to permit a party to challenge a binational panel decision on grounds, inter alia,
of misconduct or abuse of power. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(13). NAFTA has
a similar provision. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1904(13).
113. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1905(8).
114. Id. art. 1905(11).
115. Id. art. 1905(12).
116. Id. art. 1905(9).
117. Id. art. 1905(10).
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V.

CONCLUSION

The similarities in how Canada and Mexico approached AD
and CVDs in a regional trade agreement may provide clues as to
how this issue might play out in a broader context, such as a
hemispheric or multilateral trade agreement. First, both Canada and Mexico recognized that resort to unfair trade remedies
by the larger trade partner - the United States - could
threaten security of access to the U.S. market, and therefore undercut the value of a trade agreement. Second, both Canada and
Mexico sought an exception from U.S. unfair trade legislation,
and failed. Third, both Canada and Mexico tried to negotiate a
broader understanding over the use of AD and CVDs, but also
failed. 1 18 Finally, both countries settled on a binding dispute
settlement mechanism, built around an internationalized form
of judicial review of domestic agency actions, as a surrogate for a
more permanent solution to the problem of AD and CVDs between close trading partners.
If other hemispheric nations were to accede to NAFTA or
negotiate a new hemispheric trade agreement, it is likely that a
Chapter 19-like mechanism would appeal to them for the same
reason it appealed to Canada or Mexico. Trade remedy actions
like AD and CVDs arguably amount to increased protectionism,
and they are on the increase in international trade. It is in the
interest of most nations to have AD and CVD actions conform to
high standards of due process, even more so if the substance of
these actions may have a harmful impact on international trade
relations. Given the widespread use of AD and CVDs, in particular by the United States, and the difficulties in establishing
standardized substantive rules in this area, it seems probable
that other countries will consider negotiating a Chapter 19-like
mechanism.
The Canada-U.S. FTA negotiation demonstrated that it is
easier to adopt a Chapter 19 mechanism for AD and CVDs
where legal systems are similar, while the NAFTA negotiation
illustrated how accommodation can be made where systems are
different. Any attempt by hemispheric nations to accede to
NAFTA would raise some of the same issues faced in the
NAFTA Chapter 19 negotiation, such as the role of amparo
(which has been widely adopted in South America from the Mex118. In the case of AD duties, such an understanding might be the use of
national competition policy as an alternative to AD actions. For CVDs, the Subsidies Code in the Uruguay Round will likely improve the legal framework concerning subsidies and CVDs in regional trade agreements.
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ican legal system), as well as the nature and procedural standards of AD and CVD investigations and their consequent
impact on the standards of judicial review and due process
under a Chapter 19-like mechanism. Given the Mexican example, it seems likely that sufficient accommodation could be made
for other countries to accede to a Chapter 19 mechanism, especially if new accessions were negotiated on a serial basis.
Owing to the greater diversity of legal systems and the
greater complication of negotiating detailed matters of administrative law on a multilateral basis, it is less likely that a Chapter 19 mechanism would be amenable to multilateral
negotiation in the GATT. However, the pressures to establish
due process in trade remedy practices are undeniable. The conditions for the rise of Chapter 19 initially in Canadian-U.S. relations, which then extended to Mexico, were an increase in
domestic trade regulatory actions coupled with an increase in
international economic interdependence. These conditions are
not abating in the international system. To the extent that foreigners can be affected by the domestic administrative regulations of their neighbors, it is possible that they will seek forums
like Chapter 19 which are intended to ensure as much as possible that their due process rights will be protected.

